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Abstract. We propose SplInter, a new technique for proving proper-
ties of heap-manipulating programs that marries (1) a new separation
logic–based analysis for heap reasoning with (2) an interpolation-based
technique for refining heap-shape invariants with data invariants. SplIn-
ter is property directed, precise, and produces counterexample traces
when a property does not hold. Using the novel notion of spatial in-
terpolants modulo theories, SplInter can infer complex invariants over
general recursive predicates, e.g., of the form all elements in a linked list
are even or a binary tree is sorted. Furthermore, we treat interpolation
as a black box, which gives us the freedom to encode data manipulation
in any suitable theory for a given program (e.g., bit vectors, arrays, or
linear arithmetic), so that our technique immediately benefits from any
future advances in SMT solving and interpolation.
1 Introduction
Since the problem of determining whether a program satisfies a given property
is undecidable, every verification algorithm must make some compromise. There
are two classical schools of program verification, which differ in the compromise
they make: the static analysis school gives up refutation soundness (i.e., may
report false positives); and the software model checking school gives up the guar-
antee of termination. In the world of integer program verification, both schools
are well explored and enjoy cross-fertilization of ideas: each has its own strengths
and uses in different contexts. In the world of heap-manipulating programs, the
static analysis school is well-attended [10, 12, 14, 35], while the software model
checking school has remained essentially vacant. This paper initiates a program
to rectify this situation, by proposing one of the first path-based software model
checking algorithms for proving combined shape-and-data properties.
The algorithm we propose, SplInter, marries two celebrated program veri-
fication ideas: McMillan’s lazy abstraction with interpolants (Impact) algorithm
for software model checking [25], and separation logic, a program logic for rea-
soning about shape properties [32]. SplInter (like Impact) is based on a path-
sampling methodology: given a program P and safety property ϕ, SplInter
constructs a proof that P is memory safe and satisfies ϕ by sampling a finite
number of paths through the control-flow graph of P , proving them safe, and
then assembling proofs for each sample path into a proof for the whole program.
The key technical advance which enables SplInter is an algorithm for spatial
interpolation, which is used to construct proofs in separation logic for the sample
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traces (serving the same function as Craig interpolation for first-order logic in
Impact).
SplInter is able to prove properties requiring integrated heap and data
(e.g., integer) reasoning by strengthening separation logic proofs with data re-
finements produced by classical Craig interpolation, using a technique we call
spatial interpolation modulo theories. Data refinements are not tied to a specific
logical theory, giving us a rather generic algorithm and freedom to choose an
appropriate theory to encode a program’s data.
Fig. 1 summarizes the high-level operation of our algorithm. Given a program
with no heap manipulation, SplInter only computes theory interpolants and
behaves exactly like Impact, and thus one can thus view SplInter as a proper
extension of Impact to heap manipulating programs. At the other extreme,
given a program with no data manipulation, SplInter is a new shape analysis
that uses path-based relaxation to construct memory safety proofs in separation
logic.
There is a great deal of work in the static analysis school on shape analysis
and on combined shape-and-data analysis, which we will discuss further in Sec. 8.
We do not claim superiority over these techniques (which have had the benefit
of 20 years of active development). SplInter, as the first member of the soft-
ware model checking school, is not better ; however, it is fundamentally different.
Nonetheless, we will mention two of the features of SplInter (not enjoyed by
any previous verification algorithm for shape-and-data properties) that make our
approach worthy of exploration: path-based refinement and property-direction.
– Path-based refinement : This supports a progress guarantee by tightly cor-
relating program exploration with refinement, and by avoiding imprecision
due to lossy join and widening operations employed by abstract domains.
SplInter does not report false positives, and produces counterexamples for
violated properties. This comes, as usual, at the price of potential divergence.
– Property-direction: Rather than seeking the strongest invariant possible, we
compute one that is just strong enough to prove that a desired property
holds. Property direction enables scalable reasoning in rich program logics
like the one described in this paper, which combines separation logic with
first-order data refinements.
We have implemented an instantiation of our generic technique in the T2
verification tool [37], and used it to prove correctness of a number of programs,
partly drawn from open source software, requiring combined data and heap
invariants. Our results indicate the usability and promise of our approach.
Contributions We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. A generic property-directed algorithm for verifying and falsifying safety of
programs with heap and data manipulation.
2. A precise and expressive separation logic analysis for computing memory
safety proofs of program paths using a novel technique we term spatial in-
terpolation.
3. A novel interpolation-based technique for strengthening separation logic
proofs with data refinements.
Heap prover
(spatial interpolants)
Data prover
(T interpolants)
Path
sampler
Spatial(T ) interpolants
Program P
Property '
Path ⇡ from P
Proof that ⇡ is safe
No proof found
Path violates
memory safety
Path violates
property '
P is safe w.r.t. '
Fig. 1. Overview of SplInter verification algorithm.
4. An implementation and an evaluation of our technique for a fragment of
separation logic with linked lists enriched with linear arithmetic refinements.
2 Overview
In this section, we demonstrate the operation of SplInter (Fig. 1) on the
simple linked list example shown in Fig. 2. We assume that integers are un-
bounded (i.e., integer values are drawn from Z rather than machine integers) and
1: int i = nondet();
node* x = null;
2: while (i != 0)
node* tmp = malloc(node);
tmp->N = x;
tmp->D = i;
x = tmp;
i--;
3: while (x != null)
4: assert(x->D >= 0);
x = x->N;
Fig. 2. Illustrative Example
that there is a struct called node denoting a
linked list node, with a next pointer N and an in-
teger (data) element D. The function nondet() re-
turns a nondeterministic integer value. This pro-
gram starts by building a linked list in the loop
on location 2. The loop terminates if the initial
value of i is > 0, in which case a linked list of
size i is constructed, where data elements D of
list nodes range from 1 to i. Then, the loop at
location 3 iterates through the linked list assert-
ing that the data element of each node in the list
is > 0. Our goal is to prove that the assertion at
location 4 is never violated.
Sample a Program Path To start, we need a path pi through the program to
the assertion at location 4. Suppose we start by sampling the path 1,2,2,3,4,
that is, the path that goes through the first loop once, and enters the second loop
arriving at the assertion. This path is illustrated in Fig. 3 (where 2a indicates
the second occurrence of location 2). Our goal is to construct a Hoare-style
proof of this path: an annotation of each location along the path with a formula
describing reachable states, such that location 4 is annotated with a formula
implying that x->D >= 0. This goal is accomplished in two phases. First, we use
spatial interpolation to compute a memory safety proof for the path pi (Fig. 3(b)).
Second, we use theory refinement to strengthen the memory safety proof and
establish that the path satisfies the post-condition x->D >= 0 (Fig. 3(c)).
Compute Spatial Interpolants The first step in constructing the proof is to
find spatial interpolants: a sequence of separation logic formulas approximating
the shape of the heap at each program location, and forming a Hoare-style
memory safety proof of the path. Our spatial interpolation procedure is a two
step process that first symbolically executes the path in a forward pass and then
derives a weaker proof using a backward pass. The backward pass can be thought
of as an under-approximate weakest precondition computation, which uses the
symbolic heap from the forward pass to guide the under-approximation.
We start by showing the symbolic heaps in Fig. 3(a), which are the result
of the forward pass obtained by symbolically executing only heap statements
along this program path (i.e., the strongest postcondition along the path). The
separation logic annotations in Fig. 3 follow standard notation (e.g., [14]), where
a formula is of the form Π : Σ, where Π is a Boolean first-order formula over
heap variables (pointers) as well as data variables (e.g., x = null or i > 0),
and Σ is a spatial conjunction of heaplets (e.g., emp, denoting the empty heap,
or Z(x, y), a recursive predicate, e.g., that denotes a linked list between x and
y). For the purposes of this example, we assume a recursive predicate ls(x, y)
that describes linked lists. In our example, the symbolic heap at location 2a is
true : x 7→ [d′, null], where the heap consists of a node, pointed to by variable x,
with null in the N field and the (implicitly existentially quantified) variable d′ in
the D field (since so far we are only interested in heap shape and not data).
The symbolic heaps determine a memory safety proof of the path, but it
is too strong and would likely not generalize to other paths. The goal of spa-
tial interpolation is to find a sequence of annotations that are weaker than the
symbolic heaps, but that still prove memory safety of the path. A sequence of
spatial interpolants is shown in Fig. 3(b). Note that all spatial interpolants are
implicitly spatially conjoined with true; for clarity, we avoid explicitly conjoin-
ing formulas with true in the figure. For example, location 2 is annotated with
true : ls(x, null) ∗ true, indicating that there is a list on the heap, as well as other
potential objects not required to show memory safety. We compute spatial inter-
polants by going backwards along the path and asking questions of the form: how
much can we weaken the symbolic heap while still maintaining memory safety?
We will describe how to answer such questions in Section 4.
Refine with Theory Interpolants Spatial interpolants give us a memory
safety proof as an approximate heap shape at each location. Our goal now is to
strengthen these heap shapes with data refinements, in order to prove that the
assertion at the end of the path is not violated. To do so, we generate a system
of Horn clause constraints from the path in some first-order theory admitting
interpolation (e.g., linear arithmetic). These Horn clauses carefully encode the
path’s data manipulation along with the spatial interpolants, which tell us heap
shape at each location along the path. A solution of this constraint system, which
can be solved using off-the-shelf interpolant generation techniques (e.g., [26, 34]),
is a refinement (strengthening) of the memory safety proof.
In this example, we encode program operations over integers in the theory
of linear integer arithmetic, and use Craig interpolants to solve the system of
1 2 2a 3 4
true : ls(x, null)
true : emp true : x 7! [d0, null]x = null : emp true : x 7! [d0, null] true : x 7! [d0, null]
true : emp true : ls(x, null) true : ls(x, null)
true : emp true : ls(( ⌫.⌫ > i), x, null) true : ls(( ⌫.⌫ > 0), x, null) d0 > 0 : x 7! [d0, n0]
assert(x->D >=  )
+ + . . . . . .
. . . . . .* *
true : ls(( ⌫.⌫ > i), x, null)
true : x 7! [d0, n0]
int i = nondet();
node* x = null
assume(i !=  );
node* tmp = ...;
tmp->N = x;
tmp->D = i;
x = tmp; i--
assume(i ==  ) assume(x != null)
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 3. Path through program in Fig. 2, annotated with (a) results of forward symbolic
execution, (b) spatial interpolants, and (c) spatial(T ) interpolants, where T is linear
integer arithmetic. Arrows ⇒ indicate implication (entailment) direction.
constraints. A solution of this system is a set of linear arithmetic formulas that
refine our spatial interpolants and, as a result, imply the assertion we want to
prove holds. One possible solution is shown in Fig. 3(c). For example, location
2a is now labeled with true : ls((λν.ν > i), x, null), where the green parts of the
formula are those added by refinement. Specifically, after refinement, we know
that all elements in the list from x to null after the first loop have data values
greater than or equal to i, as indicated by the predicate (λν.ν > i). (In Section 3,
we formalize recursive predicates with data refinements.)
Location 4 is now annotated with d′ > 0 : x 7→ [d′, n′] ∗ true, which implies
that x->D >= 0, thus proving that the path satisfies the assertion.
From Proofs of Paths to Proofs of Programs We go from proofs of paths
to whole program proofs implicitly by building an abstract reachability tree as in
Impact [25]. To give a flavour for how this works, consider that the assertions
at 2 and 2a are identical: this implies that this assertion is an inductive invariant
at line 2. Since this assertion also happens to be strong enough to prove safety of
the program, we need not sample any longer unrollings of the first loop. However,
since we have not established the inductiveness of the assertion at 3, the proof is
not yet complete and more traces need to be explored (in fact, exploring one more
trace will do: consider the trace that unrolls the second loop once and shows that
the second time 3 is visited can also be labeled with true : ls((λν.ν > 0), x, null)).
Since our high-level algorithm is virtually the same as Impact [25], we will
not describe it further in the paper. For the remainder of this paper, we will
concentrate on the novel contribution of our algorithm: computing spatial inter-
polants with theory refinements for program paths.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Separation Logic
We define RSep, a fragment of separation logic formulas featuring points-to pred-
icates and general recursive predicates refined by theory propositions.
x, y ∈ HVar (Heap variables) E,F ∈ HTerm ::= null | x
a, b ∈ DVar (Data variables) Æ ::= A | E
A ∈ DTerm (Data terms) Π ∈ Pure ::= true | E = E | E 6= E |
ϕ ∈ DFormula (Data formulas) ϕ | Π ∧Π
Z ∈ RPred (Rec. predicates) H ∈ Heaplet ::= true | emp | E 7→ [ ~A, ~E] | Z(~θ, ~E)
θ ∈ Refinement ::= λ~a.ϕ Σ ∈ Spatial ::= H | H ∗Σ
X ⊆ Var ::= x | a P ∈ RSep ::= (∃X. Π : Σ)
Fig. 4. Syntax of RSep formulas.
Fig. 4 defines the syntax of RSep formulas. In comparison with the stan-
dard list fragment used in separation logic analyses (e.g., [3, 13, 27]), the dif-
ferentiating features of RSep are: (1) General recursive predicates, for describing
unbounded pointer structures like lists, trees, etc. (2) Recursive predicates are
augmented with a vector of refinements, which are used to constrain the data
values appearing on the data structure defined by the predicate, detailed below.
(3) Each heap cell (points-to predicate), E 7→ [ ~A, ~E], is a record consisting of
data fields (a vector ~A of DTerm) followed by heap fields (a vector ~E of HTerm).
(Notationally, we will use di to refer to the ith element of the vector ~d, and
~d[t/di] to refer to the vector ~d with the ith element modified to t.) (4) Pure
formulas contain heap and first-order data constraints.
Our definition is (implicitly) parameterized by a first-order theory T . DVar
denotes the set of theory variables, which we assume to be disjoint from HVar
(the set of heap variables). DTerm and DFormula denote the sets of theory terms
and formulas, and we assume that heap variables do not appear in theory terms.
For an RSep formula P , Var(P ) denotes its free (data and heap) variables. We
treat a Spatial formula Σ as a multiset of heaplets, and consider formulas to be
equal when they are equal as multisets. For RSep formulas P = (∃XP . ΠP : ΣP )
and Q = (∃XQ. ΠQ : ΣQ), we write P ∗Q to denote the RSep formula
P ∗Q = (∃XP ∪XQ. ΠP ∧ΠQ : ΣP ∗ΣQ)
assuming that XP is disjoint from Var(Q) and XQ is disjoint from Var(P ) (if
not, then XP and XQ are first suitably renamed). For a set of variables X, we
write (∃X. P ) to denote the RSep formula
(∃X. P ) = (∃X ∪XP . ΠP : ΣP )
Recursive predicates Each recursive predicate Z ∈ RPred is associated with
a definition that describes how the predicate is unfolded. Before we formalize
these definitions, we will give some examples.
The definition of the list segment predicate from Sec. 2 is:
ls(R, x, y) ≡ (x = y : emp) ∨
(∃d, n′. x 6= y ∧R(d) : x 7→ [d, n′] ∗ ls(R,n′, y))
In the above, R is a refinement variable, which may be instantiated to a concrete
refinement θ ∈ Refinement. For example, ls((λa.a > 0), x, y) indicates that there
is a list from x to y where every element of the list is at least 0.
A refined binary tree predicate is a more complicated example:
bt(Q,L,R, x) = (x = null : emp)
∨ (∃d, l, r. Q(d) : x 7→ [d, l, r]
∗ bt((λa.Q(a) ∧ L(d, a)), L,R, l)
∗ bt((λa.Q(a) ∧R(d, a)), L,R, r))
This predicate has three refinement variables: a unary refinement Q (which must
be satisfied by every node in the tree), a binary refinement L (which is a relation
that must hold between every node and its descendants to the left), and a binary
refinement R (which is a relation that must hold between every node and its
descendants to the right). For example,
bt((λa.true), (λa, b.a > b), (λa, b.a 6 b), x)
indicates that x is the root of a binary search tree, and
bt((λa.a > 0), (λa, b.a 6 b), (λa, b.a 6 b), x)
indicates that x is the root of a binary min-heap with non-negative elements.
To formalize these definitions, we first define refinement terms and refined
formulas: a refinement term τ is either (1) a refinement variable R or (2) an
abstraction (λa1, . . . , an.Φ), where Φ is a refined formula. A refined formula is
a conjunction where each conjunct is either a data formula (DFormula) or the
application τ( ~A) of a refinement term to a vector of data terms (DTerm).
A predicate definition has the form
Z(~R, ~x) ≡ (∃X1. Π1 ∧ Φ1 : Σ1) ∨ · · · ∨ (∃Xn. Πn ∧ Φn : Σn)
where ~R is a vector of refinement variables, ~x is a vector of heap variables, and
where refinement terms may appear as refinements in the spatial formulas Σi.
We refer to the disjuncts of the above formula as the cases for Z, and define
cases(Z(~R, ~x)) to be the set of cases of Z. ~R and ~x are bound in cases(Z(~R, ~x)),
and we will assume that predicate definitions are closed, that is, for each case of
Z, the free refinement variables belong to ~R, the free heap variables belong to ~x,
and there are no free data variables. We also assume that they are well-typed in
the sense that each refinement term τ is associated with an arity, and whenever
τ( ~A) appears in a definition, the length of ~A is the arity of τ .
Semantics The semantics of our logic, defined by a satisfaction relation s, h |=
Q, is essentially standard. Each predicate Z ∈ RPred is defined to be the least
solution1 to the following equivalence:
s, h |= Z(~θ, ~E) ⇐⇒ ∃P ∈ cases(Z(~R, ~x)). s, h |= P [~θ/~R, ~E/~x]
Note that when substituting a λ-abstraction for a refinement variable, we implic-
itly β-reduce resulting applications. For example, R(b)[(λa.a > 0)/R] = b > 0.
Semantic entailment is denoted by P |= Q, and provable entailment by P `
Q. When referring to a proof that P ` Q, we will mean a sequent calculus proof.
1 Our definition does not preclude ill-founded predicates; such predicates are simply
unsatisfiable, and do not affect the technical development in the rest of the paper.
3.2 Programs
A program P is a tuple 〈V,E, vi, ve〉, where
– V is a set of control locations, with a distinguished entry node vi ∈ V and
error (exit) node ve ∈ V , and
– E ⊆ V × V is a set of directed edges, where each e ∈ E is associated with a
program command ec.
We impose the restriction that all nodes V \ {vi} are reachable from vi via
E, and all nodes can reach ve. The syntax for program commands appears be-
low. Note that the allocation command creates a record with n data fields,
D1, . . . , Dn, and m heap fields, N1, . . . , Nm. To access the ith data field of a
record pointed to by x, we use x->Di (and similarly for heap fields). We assume
that programs are well-typed, but not necessarily memory safe.
Assignment: x := Æ
Heap store: x->Ni := E
Heap load: y := x->Ni
Assumption: assume(Π)
Data store: x->Di := A
Data load: y := x->Di
Allocation: x := new(n,m)
Disposal: free(x)
As is standard, we compile assert commands to reachability of ve.
4 Spatial Interpolants
In this section, we first define the notion of spatial path interpolants, which
serve as memory safety proofs of program paths. We then describe a technique
for computing spatial path interpolants. This algorithm has two phases: the first
is a (forwards) symbolic execution phase, which computes the strongest memory
safety proof for a path; the second is a (backwards) interpolation phase, which
weakens the proof so that it is more likely to generalize.
Spatial path interpolants are bounded from below by the strongest memory
safety proof, and (implicitly) from above by the weakest memory safety proof.
Prior to considering the generation of inductive invariants using spatial path
interpolants, consider what could be done with only one of the bounds, in gen-
eral, with either a path-based approach or an iterative fixed-point computation.
Without the upper bound, an interpolant or invariant could be computed using
a standard forward transformer and widening. But this suffers from the usual
problem of potentially widening too aggressively to prove the remainder of the
path, necessitating the design of analyses which widen conservatively at the price
of computing unnecessarily strong proofs. The upper bound neatly captures the
information that must be preserved for the future execution to be proved safe.
On the other hand, without the lower bound, an interpolant or invariant could be
computed using a backward transformer (and lower widening). But this suffers
from the usual problem that backward transformers in shape analysis explode,
due to issues such as not knowing the aliasing relationship in the pre-state. The
lower bound neatly captures such information, heavily reducing the potential for
explosion. These advantages come at the price of operating over full paths from
entry to error. Compared to a forwards iterative analysis, operating over full
paths has the advantage of having information about the execution’s past and
future when weakening at each point along the path. A forwards iterative anal-
exec(x := new(k, l), (∃X. Π : Σ)) = (∃X ∪ {x′, ~d, ~n}. (Π : Σ)[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~d, ~n])
where x′, ~d, ~n are fresh, ~d = (d1, . . . , dk), and ~n = (n1, . . . , nl).
exec(free(x), (∃X. Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n]) = (∃X. Π ∧Π 6= : Σ)
where Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n] ` x = z and Π 6= is the
conjunction of all disequalities x 6= y s.t y 7→ [ , ] ∈ Σ.
exec(x := E, (∃X. Π : Σ)) = (∃X ∪ {x′}. (x = E[x′/x]) ∗ (Π : Σ)[x′/x])
where x′ is fresh.
exec(assume(Π ′), (∃X. Π : Σ)) = (∃X. Π ∧Π ′ : Σ) .
exec(x->Ni := E, (∃X. Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n])) = (∃X. Π : Σ ∗ x 7→ [~d, ~n[E/ni]])
where i 6 |~n| and Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n] ` x = z .
exec(y := x->Ni, (∃X. Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n])) =
(∃X ∪ {y′}. (y = ni[y′/y]) ∗ (Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n])[y′/y])
where i 6 |~n| and Π : Σ ∗ z 7→ [~d, ~n] ` x = z, and y′ is fresh.
Fig. 5. Symbolic execution for heap statements. Data statements are treated as skips.
ysis, on the other hand, trades the information about the future for information
about many past executions through the use of join or widening operations.
The development in this section is purely spatial: we do not make use of
data variables or refinements in recursive predicates. Our algorithm is thus of
independent interest, outside of its context in this paper. We use Sep to refer
to the fragment of RSep in which the only data formula (appearing in pure
assertions and in refinements) is true (this fragment is equivalent to classical
separation logic). An RSep formula P , in particular including those in recursive
predicate definitions, determines a Sep formula P obtained by replacing all re-
finements (both variables and λ-abstractions) with (λ~a.true) and all DFormulas
in the pure part of P with true. Since recursive predicates, refinements, and
DFormulas appear only positively, P is no stronger than any refinement of P .
Since all refinements in Sep are trivial, we will omit them from the syntax (e.g.,
we will write Z( ~E) rather than Z((λ~a.true), ~E)).
4.1 Definition
We define a symbolic heap to be a Sep formula where the spatial part is a *-
conjunction of points-to heaplets and the pure part is a conjunction of pointer
(dis)equalities. Given a command c and a symbolic heap S, we use exec(c, S) to
denote the symbolic heap that results from symbolically executing c starting in
S (the definition of exec is essentially standard [3], and is shown in Fig. 5).
Given a program path pi = e1, . . . , en, we obtain its strongest memory safety
proof by symbolically executing pi starting from the empty heap emp. We call this
sequence of symbolic heaps the symbolic execution sequence of pi, and say that a
path pi is memory-feasible if every formula in its symbolic execution sequence is
consistent. The following proposition justifies calling this sequence the strongest
memory safety proof.
Proposition 1. For a path pi, if the symbolic execution sequence for pi is de-
fined, then pi is memory safe. If pi is memory safe and memory-feasible, then its
symbolic execution sequence is defined.
Recall that our strategy for proving program correctness is based on sampling
and proving the correctness of several program paths (a´ la Impact [25]). The
problem with strongest memory safety proofs is that they do not generalize well
(i.e., do not generate inductive invariants).
One solution to this problem is to take advantage of property direction. Given
a desired postcondition P and a (memory-safe and -feasible) path pi, the goal is
to come up with a proof that is weaker than pi’s symbolic execution sequence,
but still strong enough to show that P holds after executing pi. Coming up with
such “weak” proofs is how traditional path interpolation is used in Impact. In
light of this, we define spatial path interpolants as follows:
Definition 1 (Spatial path interpolant). Let pi = e1, . . . , en be a program
path with symbolic execution sequence S0, . . . , Sn, and let P be a Sep formula
(such that Sn |= P ). A spatial path interpolant for pi is a sequence I0, . . . , In of
Sep formulas such that
– for each i ∈ [0, n], Si |= Ii;
– for each i ∈ [1, n], {Ii−1} eci {Ii} is a valid triple in separation logic; and
– In |= P .
Our algorithm for computing spatial path interpolants is a backwards prop-
agation algorithm that employs a spatial interpolation procedure at each back-
wards step. Spatial interpolants for a single command are defined as:
Definition 2 (Spatial interpolant). Given Sep formulas S and I ′ and a com-
mand c such that exec(c, S) |= I ′, a spatial interpolant (for S, c, and I ′) is a
Sep formula I such that S |= I and {I} c {I ′} is valid.
Before describing the spatial interpolation algorithm, we briefly describe how
spatial interpolation is used to compute path interpolants. Let us use itp(S, c, I)
to denote a spatial interpolant for S, c, I, as defined above. Let pi = e1, . . . , en
be a program path and let P be a Sep formula. First, symbolically execute pi
to compute a sequence S0, . . . , Sn. Suppose that Sn ` P . Then we compute a
sequence I0, . . . , In by taking In = P and (for k < n) Ik = itp(Sk, e
c
k+1, Ik+1).
The sequence I0, . . . , In is clearly a spatial path interpolant.
4.2 Bounded Abduction
Our algorithm for spatial interpolation is based on an abduction procedure.
Abduction refers to the inference of explanatory hypotheses from observations
(in contrast to deduction, which derives conclusions from given hypotheses). The
variant of abduction we employ in this paper, which we call bounded abduction, is
simultaneously a form of abductive and deductive reasoning. Seen as a variant of
abduction, bounded abduction adds a constraint that the abduced hypothesis be
at least weak enough to be derivable from a given hypothesis. Seen as a variant
of deduction, bounded abduction adds a constraint that the deduced conclusion
be at least strong enough to imply some desired conclusion. Formally, we define
bounded abduction as follows:
Definition 3 (Bounded abduction). Let L,M,R be Sep formulas, and let X
be a set of variables. A solution to the bounded abduction problem
L ` (∃X. M ∗ [ ]) ` R
is a Sep formula A such that L |= (∃X. M ∗A) |= R.
Note how, in contrast to bi-abduction [10] where a solution is a pair of formulas,
one constrained from above and one from below, a solution to bounded abduction
problems is a single formula that is simultaneously constrained from above and
below. The fixed lower and upper bounds in our formulation of abduction give
considerable guidance to solvers, in contrast to bi-abduction, where the bounds
are part of the solution.
Sec. 6 presents our bounded abduction algorithm. For the remainder of this
section, we will treat bounded abduction as a black box, and use L ` (∃X. M ∗
[A]) ` R to denote that A is a solution to the bounded abduction problem.
4.3 Computing Spatial Interpolants
We now proceed to describe our algorithm for spatial interpolation. Given a com-
mand c and Sep formulas S and I ′ such that exec(c, S) ` I ′, this algorithm must
compute a Sep formula itp(S, c, I ′) that satisfies the conditions of Definition 2.
Several examples illustrating this procedure are given in Fig. 3.
This algorithm is defined by cases based on the command c. We present the
cases for the spatial commands; the corresponding data commands are similar.
Allocate Suppose c is x := new(n,m). We take itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃x. A), where
A is obtained as a solution to exec(c, S) ` (∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z] ∗ [A]) ` I ′, and ~a
and ~z are vectors of fresh variables of length n and m, respectively.
Deallocate Suppose c is free(x). We take itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃~a, ~z. I ′ ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z]),
where ~a and ~z are vectors of fresh variables whose lengths are determined by the
unique heap cell which is allocated to x in S.
Assignment Suppose c is x := E. We take itp(S, c, I ′) = I ′[E/x].
Store Suppose c is x->Ni := E. We take itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃~a, ~z. A ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z]),
where A is obtained as a solution to exec(c, S) ` (∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z[E/zi]]∗[A]) ` I ′
and where ~a and ~z are vectors of fresh variables whose lengths are determined
by the unique heap cell which is allocated to x in S.
Example 1. Suppose that S is t 7→ [4, y, null] ∗ x 7→ [2, null, null] where the cells
have one data and two pointer fields, c is t->N0 := x, and I ′ is bt(t). Then we
can compute exec(c, S) = t 7→ [4, x, null] ∗ x 7→ [2, null, null], and then solve the
bounded abduction problem
exec(c, S) ` (∃a, z1. t 7→ [a, x, z1] ∗ [ ]) ` I ′ .
One possible solution is A = bt(x) ∗ bt(z1), which yields
itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃a, z0, z1. t 7→ [a, z0, z1] ∗ bt(z1) ∗ bt(x)) . y
Load Suppose c is y := x->Ni. Suppose that ~a and ~z are vectors of fresh variables
of lengths | ~A| and | ~E| where S is of the form Π : Σ ∗ w 7→ [ ~A, ~E] and Π :
Σ ∗w 7→ [ ~A, ~E] ` x = w (this is the condition under which exec(c, S) is defined,
see Fig. 5). Let y′ be a fresh variable, and define S = (y = zi[y′/y]) ∗ (Π :
Σ ∗ w 7→ [~a, ~z])[y′/y]. Note that S ` (∃y′. S) ≡ exec(c, S) ` I ′.
We take itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃~a, ~z. A[zi/y, y/y′] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z]) where A is obtained
as a solution to S ` (∃~a, ~z. x[y′/y] 7→ [~a, ~z] ∗ [A]) ` I ′.
Example 2. Suppose that S is y = t : y 7→ [1, null, x] ∗x 7→ [5, null, null], c is y :=
y->N1, and I ′ is y 6= null : bt(t). Then S is
y = x ∧ y′ = t : y′ 7→ [1, null, x] ∗ x 7→ [5, null, null]
We can then solve the bounded abduction problem
S ` (∃a, z0, z1. y′ 7→ [a, z0, z1] ∗ [ ]) ` I ′
A possible solution is y 6= null ∧ y′ = t : bt(z0) ∗ bt(z1), yielding
itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃a, z0, z1.z1 6= null∧y = t : bt(z0)∗bt(z1)∗y 7→ [a, z0, z1]) . y
Assumptions The interpolation rules defined up to this point cannot introduce
recursive predicates, in the sense that if I ′ is a *-conjunction of points-to pred-
icates then so is itp(S, c, I ′).2 A *-conjunction of points-to predicates is exact
in the sense that it gives the full layout of some part of the heap. The power
of recursive predicates lies in their ability to be abstract rather than exact, and
describe only the shape of the heap rather than its exact layout. It is a special
circumstance that {P} c {I ′} holds when I ′ is exact in this sense and P is not:
intuitively, it means that by executing c we somehow gain information about
the program state, which is precisely the case for assume commands.
For an example of how spatial interpolation can introduce a recursive predi-
cate at an assume command, consider the problem of computing an interpolant
itp(S, assume(x 6= null), (∃a, z. x 7→ [a, z] ∗ true))
where S ≡ x 7→ [d, y] ∗ y 7→ [d′, null]: a desirable interpolant may be ls(x, null) ∗
true. The disequality introduced by the assumption ensures that one of the cases
of the recursive predicate ls(x, null) (where the list from x to null is empty) is
impossible, which implies that the other case (where x is allocated) must hold.
Towards this end, we now define an auxiliary function intro which we will use
to introduce recursive predicates for the assume interpolation rules. Let P,Q be
Sep formulas such that P ` Q, let Z be a recursive predicate and ~E be a vector
of heap terms. We define intro(Z, ~E, P,Q) as follows: if P ` (∃∅. Z( ~E) ∗ [A]) ` Q
has a solution and A 0 Q, define intro(Z, ~E, P,Q) = Z( ~E) ∗A. Otherwise, define
intro(Z, ~E, P,Q) = Q.
Intuitively, the abduction problem has a solution when P implies Z( ~E) and
Z( ~E) can be excised from Q. The condition A 0 Q is used to ensure that the
2 But if I ′ does contain recursive predicates, then itp(S, c, I ′) may also.
excision from Q is non-trivial (i.e., the part of the heap that satisfies Z( ~E)
“consumes” some heaplet of Q).
To define the interpolation rule for assumptions, suppose c is assume(E 6=
F) (the case of equality assumptions is similar). Letting {〈Zi, ~Ei〉}i6n be an
enumeration of the (finitely many) possible choices of Z and ~E, we define a
formula M to be the result of applying intro to I ′ over all possible choices of Z
and ~E:
M = intro(Z1, ~E1, S ∧ E 6= F, intro(Z2, ~E2, S ∧ E 6= F, . . . ))
where the innermost occurrence of intro in this definition is intro(Zn, ~En, S∧E 6=
F, I ′). Since intro preserves entailment (in the sense that if P ` Q then P `
intro(Z, ~E, P,Q)), we have that S∧E 6= F `M . From a proof of S∧E 6= F `M ,
we can construct a formula M ′ which is entailed by S and differs from M only
in that it renames variables and exposes additional equalities and disequalities
implied by S, and take itp(S, c, I ′) to be this M ′.
The construction of M ′ from M is straightforward but tedious. The procedure
is detailed in Appendix D ; here, we will just give an example to give intuition
on why it is necessary. Suppose that S is x = w : y 7→ z and I ′ is ls(w, z), and
c is assume(x = y). Since there is no opportunity to introduce new recursive
predicates in I ′, M is simply ls(w, z). However, M is not a valid interpolant
since S 6|= M , so we must expose the equality x = w and rename w to y in the
list segment in M ′ ≡ x = w : ls(y, z).
In practice, it is undesirable to enumerate all possible choices of Z and
~E when constructing M (considering that if there are k in-scope data terms,
a recursive predicate of arity n requires enumerating kn choices for ~E). A
reasonable heuristic is to let Π be the strongest pure formula implied by S,
and enumerate only those combinations of Z and ~E such that there is some
Π ′ : Σ′ ∈ cases(Z(~R, ~x)) such that Π ′[ ~E/~x] ∧ Π ∧ x 6= y is unsatisfiable. For
example, for assume(x 6= y), this heuristic means that we enumerate only 〈x, y〉
and 〈y, x〉 (i.e, we attempt to introduce a list segment from x to y and from y
to x).
We conclude this section with a theorem stating the correctness of our spatial
interpolation procedure.
Theorem 1. Let S and I ′ be Sep formulas and let c be a command such that
exec(c, S) ` I ′. Then itp(S, c, I ′) is a spatial interpolant for S, c, and I ′.
5 Spatial Interpolation Modulo Theories
We now consider the problem of refining (or strengthening) a given separation
logic proof of memory safety with information about (non-spatial) data. This
refinement procedure results in a proof of a conclusion stronger than can be
proved by reasoning about the heap alone. In view of our example from Fig. 3,
this section addresses how to derive the third sequence (Spatial Interpolants
Modulo Theories) from the second (Spatial Interpolants).
The input to our spatial interpolation modulo theories procedure is a path
pi, a separation logic (Sep) proof ζ of the triple {true : emp} pi {true : true} (i.e.,
Entailment rules
Star
C0 I Π ∧ Φ : Σ0 ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′0 C1 I Π ∧ Φ : Σ1 ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′1
C0; C1 I Π ∧ Φ : Σ0 ∗Σ1 ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′0 ∗Σ′1
Points-to
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ I Π ∧ Φ : E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ]
Fold
C I Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ P [~τ/~R, ~E/~x]
C I Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ Z(~τ, ~E) P ∈ cases(Z(
~R, ~x))
Unfold
C1 I Π : Σ ∗ P1[~τ/~R, ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′ · · ·
Cn I Π : Σ ∗ Pn[~τ/~R, ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
C1; . . . ; Cn I Π : Σ ∗ Z(~τ, ~E) ` Π ′ : Σ′
{P1, . . . , Pn} =
cases(Z(~R, ~x))
Predicate
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ;Ψ ′1 ← Ψ1 ∧ Φ; . . . ;Ψ ′|~τ | ← Ψ|~τ | ∧ Φ I
Π ∧ Φ : Z(~τ, ~E) ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Z(~τ ′, ~E)
Where τi = (λ~ai.Ψi)
and τ ′i = (λ~ai.Ψ
′
i)
Execution rules
Data-Assume
C I P ∧ ϕ ` Q
C I {P} assume(ϕ) {Q}
Free
C I P ` Π ∧ Φ : Σ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
C I {P} free(x) {Π ∧ Φ : Σ}
Sequence
C0 I {P} pi0 {Ô} C1 I {Ô} pi1 {Q}
C0; C1 I {P} pi0;pi1 {Q}
Data-Load
C0 I P ` (∃X. Π ∧ Φ̂ : Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])
C1 I (∃X, a′. Π[a′/a] ∧ Φ̂[a′/a] ∧ a = Ai[a′/a] : (Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])[a′/a]) ` Q
C0; C1 I {P} a := x->Di {Q}
Data-Assign
C I (∃a′. Π ∧ Φ[a′/a] ∧ a = A[a′/a] : Σ[a′/a] ` Q)
C I {Π ∧ Φ : Σ} a := A {Q}
Data-Store
C0 I P ` (∃X. Π ∧ Φ̂ : Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])
C1 I (∃X, a′. Π ∧ Φ̂ ∧ a′ = A : Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A[a′/Ai], ~E]) ` Q
C0; C1 I {P} x->Di := A {Q}
Alloc
C I (∃x′,~a, ~x. Π[x′/x] ∧ Φ : Σ[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~x]) ` Q
C I {Π ∧ Φ : Σ} x := new(n,m) {Q}
Fig. 6. Constraint generation.
Refined memory safety proof ζ′
{R0(i) : true}i = nondet(); x = null
{R1(i) : ls((λa.Rls1(ν, i)), x, null) ∗ true}assume(i != 0); ...; i--;
{R2(i) : ls((λa.Rls2(ν, i)), x, null) ∗ true}assume(i == 0)
{R3(i) : ls((λa.Rls3(ν, i)), x, null) ∗ true}assume(x != null)
{(∃d′, y. R4(i, d′) : x 7→ [d′, y] ∗ true)}
Constraint system C
R0(i
′)← true
R1(i
′)← R0(i)
R2(i
′)← R1(i) ∧ i 6= 0 ∧ i′ = i+ 1
R3(i)← R2(i) ∧ i = 0
R4(i, d
′)← R3(i) ∧Rls3(d′, i)
Rls2(ν, i
′)← R1(i)∧Rls1(ν, i)∧ i 6= 0∧ i′ = i+ 1
Rls2(ν, i
′)← R1(i) ∧ ν = i ∧ i 6= 0 ∧ i′ = i+ 1
Rls3(ν, i)← R2(i) ∧Rls2(ν, i) ∧ i = 0
d′ > 0← R4(i, d′)
Solution σ
R0(i) : true
R1(i) : true
R2(i) : true
R3(i) : true
R4(i, d
′) : d′ > 0
Rls1(ν, i) : ν > i
Rls2(ν, i) : ν > i
Rls3(ν, i) : ν > 0
Fig. 7. Example constraints.
a memory safety proof for pi), and a postcondition ϕ. The goal is to transform
ζ into an RSep proof of the triple {true : emp} pi {ϕ : true}. The high-level
operation of our procedure is as follows. First, we traverse the memory safety
proof ζ and build (1) a corresponding refined proof ζ ′ where refinements may
contain second-order variables, and (2) a constraint system C which encodes
logical dependencies between the second-order variables. We then attempt to
find a solution to C, which is an assignment of data formulas to the second-order
variables such that all constraints are satisfied. If we are successful, we use the
solution to instantiate the second-order variables in ζ ′, which yields a valid RSep
proof of the triple {true : emp} pi {ϕ : true}.
Horn Clauses The constraint system produced by our procedure is a recursion-
free set of Horn clauses, which can be solved efficiently using existing first-order
interpolation techniques (see [33] for a detailed survey). Following [17], we define
a query to be an application Q(~a) of a second-order variable Q to a vector of
(data) variables, and define an atom to be either a data formula ϕ ∈ DFormula
or a query Q(~a). A Horn clause is of the form
h← b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bN
where each of h, b1, . . . , bN is an atom. In our constraint generation rules, it
will be convenient to use a more general form which can be translated to Horn
clauses: we will allow constraints of the form
h1 ∧ · · · ∧ hM ← b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bN
(shorthand for the set of Horn clauses {hi ← b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bN}16i6M ) and we will
allow queries to be of the form Q( ~A) (i.e., take arbitrary data terms as arguments
rather than variables). If C and C′ are sets of constraints, we will use C; C′ to
denote their union.
A solution to a system of Horn clauses C is a map σ that assigns each second-
order variable Q of arity k a DFormula Qσ with free variables drawn from ~ν =
〈ν1, . . . , νk〉 such that for each clause
h← b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bN
in C the implication
∀A.(hσ ⇐ (∃B.bσ1 ∧ · · · ∧ bσN ))
holds, where A is the set of free variables in h and B is the set of variables free
in some bi but not in h. In the above, for any data formula ϕ, ϕ
σ is defined to be
ϕ, and for any query Q(~a), Q(~a)σ is defined to be Qσ[a1/ν1, . . . , ak/νk] (where
k is the arity of Q).
Constraint Generation Calculus We will present our algorithm for spatial
interpolation modulo theories as a calculus whose inference rules mirror the
ones of separation logic. The calculus makes use of the same syntax used in
recursive predicate definitions in Sec. 3. We use τ to denote a refinement term
and Φ to denote a refined formula. The calculus has two types of judgements.
An entailment judgement is of the form
C I (∃X. Π ∧ Φ : Σ) ` (∃X ′. Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′)
where Π,Π ′ are equational pure assertions over heap terms, Σ,Σ′ are refined
spatial assertions, Φ, Φ′ are refined formulas, and C is a recursion-free set of
Horn clauses. Such an entailment judgement should be read as “for any solution
σ to the set of constraints C, (∃X. Π ∧ Φσ : Σσ) entails (∃X ′. Π ′ ∧ Φ′σ : Σ′σ),”
where Φσ is Φ with all second order variables replaced by their data formula
assignments in σ (and similarly for Σσ).
Similarly, an execution judgement is of the form
C I {(∃X. Π ∧ Φ : Σ)} pi {(∃X ′. Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′)}
where pi is a path and X,X ′, Π,Π ′, Φ, Φ′, Σ,Σ′, and C are as above. Such an ex-
ecution judgement should be read as “for any solution σ to the set of constraints
C,
{(∃X. Π ∧ Φσ : Σσ)} pi {(∃X ′. Π ′ ∧ Φ′σ : Σ′σ)}
is a valid triple.”
Let pi be a path, let ζ be a separation logic proof of the triple {true :
emp} pi {true : true} (i.e., a memory safety proof for pi), and let ϕ ∈ DFormula be
a postcondition. Given these inputs, our algorithm operates as follows. We use
~v to denote a vector of all data-typed program variables. The triple is rewritten
with refinements by letting R and R′ be fresh second-order variables of arity
|~v| and conjoining R(~v) and R′(~v) to the pre and post. By recursing on ζ, at
each step applying the appropriate rule from our calculus in Fig. 6, we derive a
judgement
ζ′
C I {true ∧R(~v) : true} pi {true ∧R′(~v) : true}
and then compute a solution σ to the constraint system
C; R(~v)← true; ϕ← R′(~v)
(if one exists). The algorithm then returns ζ ′σ, the proof obtained by applying
the substitution σ to ζ ′.
Intuitively, our algorithm operates by recursing on a separation logic proof,
introducing refinements into formulas on the way down, and building a system
of constraints on the way up. Each inference rule in the calculus encodes both
the downwards and upwards step of this algorithm. For example, consider the
Fold rule of our calculus: we will illustrate the intended reading of this rule
with a concrete example. Suppose that the input to the algorithm is a derivation
of the following form:
ζ0
x 7→ [a, null] ` (∃b, y. x 7→ [b, y] ∗ ls(y, null))
Q(i) : x 7→ [a, null] ` R(i) : ls((λa.S(x, a)), x, null) Fold
(i.e., a derivation where the last inference rule is an application of Fold, and
the conclusion has already been rewritten with refinements). We introduce re-
finements in the premise and recurse on the following derivation:
ζ0
Q(i) : x 7→ [a, null] ` (∃b, y. R(i) ∧ S(i, b) : x 7→ [b, y] ∗ ls((λa.S(x, a)), y, null))
The result of this recursive call is a refined derivation ζ ′0 as well as a constraint
system C. We then return both (1) the refined derivation obtained by catenating
the conclusion of the Fold rule onto ζ ′0 and (2) the constraint system C.
A crucial point of our algorithm is hidden inside the hat notation in Fig. 6
(e.g, Ô in Sequence): this notation is used to denote the introduction of fresh
second-order variables. For many of the inference rules (such as Fold), the re-
finements which appear in the premises follow fairly directly from the refinements
which appear in the conclusion. However, in some rules entirely new formulas
appear in the premises which do not appear in the conclusion (e.g., in the Se-
quence rule in Fig. 6, the intermediate assertion Ô is an arbitrary formula which
has no obvious relationship to the precondition P or the postcondition Q). We
refine such formula O by introducing a fresh second-order variable for the pure
assertion and for each refinement term that appears in O. The following offers
a concrete example.
Example 3. Consider the trace pi in Fig. 3. Suppose that we are given a memory
safety proof for pi which ends in an application of the Sequence rule:
{true : emp} pi0 {true : ls(x, null)}
{true : ls(x, null)} pi1 {(∃b, y. true : x 7→ [b, y])}
{Q(i) : emp} pi0;pi1 {(∃b, y. R(i, b) : x 7→ [b, y])} Sequence
where pi is decomposed as pi0;pi1, pi0 is the path from 1 to 3, and pi1 is the path
from 3 to 4. Let O = true : ls(x, null) denote the intermediate assertion which ap-
pears in this proof. To derive Ô, we introduce two fresh second order variables, S
(with arity 1) and T (with arity 2), and define Ô = S(i) : ls((λa.T (i, a)), x, null).
The resulting inference is as follows:
{Q(i) : emp} pi0 {S(i) : ls((λa.T (i, a)), x, null)}
{S(i) : ls((λa.T (i, a)), x, null)} pi1 {(∃b, y. R(i, b) : x 7→ [b, y])}
{Q(i) : emp} pi0;pi1 {(∃b, y. R(i, b) : x 7→ [b, y])} y
The following example provides a simple demonstration of our constraint
generation procedure:
Example 4. Recall the example in Fig. 3 of Sec. 2. The row of spatial interpolants
in Fig. 3 is a memory safety proof ζ of the program path. Fig. 7 shows the refined
proof ζ ′, which is the proof ζ with second-order variables that act as placeholders
for data formulas. For the sake of illustration, we have simplified the
constraints by skipping a number of intermediate annotations in the
Hoare-style proof.
The constraint system C specifies the logical dependencies between the in-
troduced second-order variables in ζ ′. For instance, the relation between R2
and R3 is specified by the Horn clause R3(i) ← R2(i) ∧ i = 0, which takes
into account the constraint imposed by assume (i == 0) in the path. The Horn
clause d′ > 0 ← R4(i, d′) specifies the postcondition defined by the assertionassert(x->D >= 0), which states that the value of the data field of the node x
should be > 0.
Replacing second-order variables in ζ ′ with their respective solutions in σ
produces a proof that the assertion at the end of the path holds (last row of
Fig. 3). y
Soundness and Completeness The key result regarding the constraint sys-
tems produced by these judgements is that any solution to the constraints yields
a valid refined proof. The formalization of the result is the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). Suppose that pi is a path, ζ is a derivation of the
judgement C I {P} pi {Q}, and that σ is a solution to C. Then ζσ, the proof
obtained by applying the substitution σ to ζ, is a (refined) separation logic proof
of {Pσ} pi {Qσ}.
Another crucial result for our counterexample generation strategy is a kind of
completeness theorem, which effectively states that the strongest memory safety
proof always admits a refinement.
Theorem 3 (Completeness). Suppose that pi is a memory-feasible path and
ζ is a derivation of the judgement C I {R0(~v) : emp} pi {R1(~v) : true} obtained
by symbolic execution. If ϕ is a data formula such that {true : emp} pi {ϕ : true}
holds, then there is a solution σ to C such that Rσ1 (~v)⇒ ϕ.
6 Bounded Abduction
In this section, we discuss our algorithm for bounded abduction. Given a bounded
abduction problem
L ` (∃X. M ∗ [ ]) ` R
we would like to find a formula A such that L ` (∃X. M ∗A) ` R. Our algorithm
is sound but not complete: it is possible that there exists a solution to the
bounded abduction problem, but our procedure cannot find it. In fact, there
is in general no complete procedure for bounded abduction, as a consequence
of the fact that we do not pre-suppose that our proof system for entailment is
complete, or even that entailment is decidable.
Empty
Π |= Π′
Π : [emp]c ` Π′ : 〈[emp]c  emp〉
Star
Π : Σ0 ` Π′ : Σ′0 Π : Σ1 ` Π′ : Σ′1
Π : Σ0 ∗Σ1 ` Π′ : Σ′0 ∗Σ′1
Points-to
Π |= Π′
Π : [E 7→ [a, F ]]c ` Π′ : 〈[E 7→ [a, F ]]c  E 7→ [a, F ]〉
True
Π |= Π′
Π : Σ ` Π′ : 〈[true]c  true〉
Substitution
Π[E/x] : Σ[E/x] ` Π′[E/x] : Σ′[E/x] Π |= x = E
Π : Σ ` Π′ : Σ′
∃-right
P ` Q[Æ/x]
P ` (∃x. Q)
Fig. 8. Coloured strengthening. All primed variables are chosen fresh.
High level description Our algorithm proceeds in three steps:
1. Find a colouring of L. This is an assignment of a colour, either red or blue, to
each heaplet appearing in L. Intuitively, red heaplets are used to satisfy M ,
and blue heaplets are left over. This colouring can be computed by recursion
on a proof of L ` (∃X. M ∗ true).
2. Find a coloured strengthening Π : [M ′]r ∗ [A]b of R. (We use the notation
[Σ]r or [Σ]b to denote a spatial formula Σ of red or blue colour, respectively.)
Intuitively, this is a formula that (1) entails R and (2) is coloured in such a
way that the red heaplets correspond to the red heaplets of L, and the blue
heaplets correspond to the blue heaplets of L. This coloured strengthening
can be computed by recursion on a proof of L ` R using the colouring of L
computed in step 1.
3. Check Π ′ : M ∗ A |= R, where Π ′ is the strongest pure formula implied
by L. This step is necessary because M may be weaker than M ′. If the
entailment check fails, then our algorithm fails to compute a solution to the
bounded abduction problem. If the entailment check succeeds, then Π ′′ : A
is a solution, where Π ′′ is the set of all equalities and disequalities in Π ′
which were actually used in the proof of the entailment Π ′ : M ∗ A |= R
(roughly, all those equalities and disequalities which appear in the leaves of
the proof tree, plus the equalities that were used in some instance of the
Substitution rule).
First, we give an example to illustrate these high-level steps:
Example 5. Suppose we want to solve the following bounded abduction problem:
L ` ls(x, y) ∗ [ ] ` R
where L = x 7→ [a, y] ∗ y 7→ [b, null] and R = (∃z. x 7→ [a, z] ∗ ls(y, null)). Our
algorithm operates as follows:
1. Colour L: [x 7→ [a, y]]r ∗ [y 7→ [b, null]]b
2. Colour R: (∃z. [x 7→ [a, z]]r ∗ [ls(y, null)]b)
3. Prove the entailment
x 6= null ∧ y 6= null ∧ x 6= y : ls(x, y) ∗ ls(y, null) |= R
This proof succeeds, and uses the pure assertion x 6= y.
Our algorithm computes x 6= y : ls(y, null) as the solution to the bounded ab-
duction problem. y
We now elaborate our bounded abduction algorithm. We assume that L
is quantifier free (without loss of generality, since quantified variables can be
Skolemized) and saturated in the sense that for any pure formula Π ′, if L ` Π ′,
where L = Π : Σ, then Π ` Π ′.
Step 1 The first step of the algorithm is straightforward. If we suppose that
there exists a solution, A, to the bounded abduction problem, then by definition
we must that have L |= (∃X. M ∗ A). Since (∃X. M ∗ A) |= (∃X. M ∗ true),
we must also have L |= (∃X. M ∗ true). We begin step 1 by computing a proof
of L ` (∃X. M ∗ true). If we fail, then we abort the procedure and report that
we cannot find a solution to the abduction problem. If we succeed, then we can
colour the heaplets of L as follows: for each heaplet E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] in L, either
E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] was used in an application of the Points-to axiom in the proof of
L ` (∃X. M ∗ true) or not. If yes, we colour E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] red; otherwise, we colour
it blue. We denote a heaplet H coloured by a colour c by [H]c.
Step 2 The second step is to find a coloured strengthening of R. Again, suppos-
ing that there is some solution A to the bounded abduction problem, we must
have L |= (∃X. M ∗A) |= R, and therefore L |= R. We begin step 2 by comput-
ing a proof of L ` R. If we fail, then we abort. If we succeed, then we define a
coloured strengthening of R by recursion on the proof of L ` R. Intuitively, this
algorithm operates by inducing a colouring on points-to predicates in the leaves
of the proof tree from the colouring of L (via the Points-to rule in Fig. 8) and
then only folding recursive predicates when all the folded heaplets have the same
colour.
More formally, for each formula P appearing as the consequent of some se-
quent in a proof tree, our algorithm produces a mapping from heaplets in P
to coloured spatial formulas. The mapping is represented using the notation
〈Σ  H〉, which denotes that the heaplet H is mapped to the coloured spatial
formula Σ. For each recursive predicate Z and each (∃X. Π : H1 ∗· · · ∗ Hn) ∈
cases(Z(~R, ~x)), we define two versions of the fold rule, corresponding to when
H1, . . . ,Hn are coloured homogeneously (Fold1) and heterogeneously (Fold2):
Fold1
(Π : Σ ` Π′ : Σ′ ∗ 〈[H1]c H1〉 ∗· · · ∗ 〈[Hn]c Hn〉)[~E/~x]
Π : Σ ` Π′ : Σ′ ∗ 〈[Z(~E)]c  Z(~E)〉
Fold2
(Π : Σ ` Π′ : Σ′ ∗ 〈Σ′1 H1〉 ∗· · · ∗ 〈Σ′n Hn〉)[~E/~x]
Π : Σ ` Π′ : Σ′ ∗ 〈Σ′1 ∗· · · ∗Σ′n  Z(~E)〉
The remaining rules for our algorithm are presented formally in Fig. 8.3 To
illustrate how this algorithm works, consider the Fold1 and Fold2 rules. If a
given (sub-)proof finishes with an instance of Fold that folds H1 ∗ · · · ∗Hn into
Z( ~E), we begin by colouring the sub-proof of
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗H1 ∗· · · ∗Hn
This colouring process produces a coloured heaplet Σi for each Hi. If there is
some colour c such that each Σ′i is [Hi]
c, then we apply Fold1 and Z( ~E) gets
mapped to [Z( ~E)]c. Otherwise (if there is some i such that Σi is not Hi or there
is some i, j such that Σi and Σj have different colours), we apply Fold2, and
map Z( ~E) to Σ1 ∗· · · ∗Σn.
After colouring a proof, we define A to be the blue part of R. That is, if the
colouring process ends with a judgement of
Π : [Σ1]
r ∗ [Σ2]b ` Π ′ : 〈[Σ′11]r ∗ [Σ12]b H1〉 ∗ · · · ∗ 〈[Σ′n1]r ∗ [Σn2]b Hn〉
(where for any coloured spatial formulaΣ, its partition into red and blue heaplets
is denoted by [Σ1]
r ∗ [Σ2]b), we define A to be Π ′ : Σ12 ∗· · · ∗ Σn2. This choice
is justified by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose that
Π : [Σ1]
r ∗ [Σ2]b ` Π ′ : 〈[Σ′11]r ∗ [Σ12]b H1〉 ∗ · · · ∗ 〈[Σ′n1]r ∗ [Σn2]b Hn〉
is derivable using the rules of Fig. 8, and that the antecedent is saturated. Then
the following hold:
– Π ′ : Σ11 ∗Σ12 ∗· · · ∗Σn2 |= Π ′ : H1 ∗· · · ∗Hn;
– Π : Σ1 |= Π ′ : Σ11 ∗· · · ∗Σn1; and
– Π : Σ2 |= Π ′ : Σ12 ∗· · · ∗Σn2.
Step 3 The third step of our algorithm is to check the entailmentΠ : M∗A |= R.
To illustrate why this is necessary, consider the following example:
Example 6. Suppose we want to solve the following bounded abduction problem:
x 6= y : x 7→ [a, y] ` ls(x, y) ∗ [ ] ` x 7→ [a, y] .
In Step 1, we compute the colouring x 6= y : [x 7→ [a, y]]r ∗ [emp]b of the left
hand side. In step 2, we compute the colouring [x 7→ [a, y]]r ∗ [emp]b of the right
hand side. However, emp is not a solution to the bounded abduction problem.
In fact, there is no solution to the bounded abduction problem. Intuitively, this
is because M is too weak to entail the red part of the right hand side. y
7 Implementation and Evaluation
Our primary goal is to study the feasibility of our proposed algorithm. To that
end, we implemented an instantiation of our generic algorithm with the linked
list recursive predicate ls (as defined in Sec. 3) and refinements in the theory
of linear arithmetic (QF LRA). The following describes our implementation and
evaluation of SplInter in detail.
3 Note that some of the inference rules are missing. This is because these rules are
inapplicable (in the case of Unfold and Inconsistent) or unnecessary (in the case
of null-not-Lval and *-Partial), given our assumptions on the antecedent.
Implementation We implemented SplInter in the T2 safety and termi-
nation verifier [37]. Specifically, we extended T2’s front-end to handle heap-
manipulating programs, and used its safety checking component (which im-
plements McMillan’s Impact algorithm) as a basis for our implementation of
SplInter. To enable reasoning in separation logic, we implemented an entail-
ment checker for RSep along with a bounded abduction procedure.
We implemented a constraint-based solver using the linear rational arith-
metic interpolation techniques of Rybalchenko and Stokkermans [34] to solve
the non-recursive Horn clauses generated by SplInter. Although many off-the-
shelf tools for interpolation exist (e.g., [26]) we implemented our own solver for
experimentation and evaluation purposes to allow us more flexibility in control-
ling the forms of interpolants we are looking for. We expect that SplInter
would perform even better using these highly tuned interpolation engines.
Our main goal is to evaluate the feasibility of our proposed extension of
interpolation-based verification to heap and data reasoning, and not necessar-
ily to demonstrate performance improvements against other tools. Nonetheless,
we note that there are two tools that target similar programs: (1) Thor [22],
which computes a memory safety proof and uses off-the-shelf numerical verifiers
to strengthen it, and (2) Xisa [12], which combines shape and data abstract do-
mains in an abstract interpretation framework. Thor cannot compute arbitrary
refinements of recursive predicates (like the ones demonstrated here and required
in our benchmarks) unless they are manually supplied with the required theory
predicates. Instantiated with the right abstract data domains, Xisa can in prin-
ciple handle most programs we target in our evaluation. (Xisa was unavailable
for comparison [11].) Sec. 8 provides a detailed comparison with related work.
Benchmarks To evaluate SplInter, we used a number of linked list bench-
marks that require heap and data reasoning. First, we used a number of simple
benchmarks: listdata is similar to Fig. 2, where a linked list is constructed and
its data elements are later checked; twolists requires an invariant comparing
data elements of two lists (all elements in list A are greater than those in list
B); ptloop tests our spatial interpolation technique, where the head of the list
must not be folded in order to ensure its data element is accessible; and refCount
is a reference counting program, where our goal is to prove memory safety (no
double free). For our second set of benchmarks, we used a cut-down version of
BinChunker (http://he.fi/bchunk/), a Linux utility for converting between dif-
ferent audio CD formats. BinChunker maintains linked lists and uses their data
elements for traversing an array. Our property of interest is thus ensuring that
all array accesses are within bounds. To test our approach, we used a number
of modifications of BinChunker, bchunk a to bchunk f, where a is the simplest
benchmark and f is the most complex one.
Heuristics We employed a number of heuristics to improve our implementation.
First, given a program path to prove correct, we attempt to find a similar proof
to previously proven paths that traverse the same control flow locations. This
is similar to the forced covering heuristic of [25] to force path interpolants to
generalize to inductive invariants. Second, our Horn clause solver uses Farkas’
Benchmark #ProvePath Time (s) T Time Sp. Time
listdata 5 1.37 0.45 0.2
twolists 5 3.12 2.06 0.27
ptloop 3 1.03 0.28 0.15
refCount 14 1.6 0.59 0.14
bchunk a 6 1.56 0.51 0.25
bchunk b 18 4.78 1.7 0.2
bchunk c 69 31.6 14.3 0.26
bchunk d 23 9.3 4.42 0.27
bchunk e 52 30.1 12.2 0.25
bchunk f 57 22.4 12.0 0.25
Table 1. Results of running SplInter on our benchmark set.
lemma to compute linear arithmetic interpolants. We found that minimizing the
number of non-zero Farkas coefficients results in more generalizable refinements.
A similar heuristic is employed by [1].
Results Table 1 shows the results of running SplInter on our benchmark suite.
Each row shows the number of calls to ProvePath (number of paths proved), the
total time taken by SplInter in seconds, the time taken to generate Horn clauses
and compute theory interpolants (T Time), and the time taken to compute spa-
tial interpolants (Sp. Time). SplInter proves all benchmarks correct w.r.t. their
respective properties. As expected, on simpler examples, the number of paths
sampled by SplInter is relatively small (3 to 14). In the bchunk * examples,
SplInter examines up to 69 paths (bchunk c). It is important to note that, in
all benchmarks, almost half of the total time is spent in theory interpolation. We
expect this can be drastically cut with the use of a more efficient interpolation
engine. The time taken by spatial interpolation is very small in comparison, and
becomes negligible in larger examples. The rest of the time is spent in checking
entailment of RSep formulas and other miscellaneous operations.
Our results highlight the utility of our proposed approach. Using our proto-
type implementation of SplInter, we were able to verify a set of realistic pro-
grams that require non-trivial combinations of heap and data reasoning. We ex-
pect the performance of our prototype implementation of SplInter can greatly
improve with the help of state-of-the-art Horn clause solvers, and more efficient
entailment checkers for separation logic.
8 Related Work
Abstraction Refinement for the Heap To the best of our knowledge, the
work of Botincan et al. [7] is the only separation logic shape analysis that em-
ploys a form of abstraction refinement. It starts with a family of separation logic
domains of increasing precision, and uses spurious counterexample traces (re-
ported by forward fixed-point computation) to pick a more precise domain to
restart the analysis and (possibly) eliminate the counterexample. Limitations of
this technique include: (1) The precision of the analysis is contingent on the set
of abstract domains it is started with. (2) The refinement strategy (in contrast
to SplInter) does not guarantee progress (it may explore the same path re-
peatedly), and may report false positives. On the other hand, given a program
path, SplInter is guaranteed to find a proof for the path or correctly declare it
an unsafe execution. (3) Finally, it is unclear whether refinement with a powerful
theory like linear arithmetic can be encoded in such a framework, e.g., as a set
of domains with increasingly more arithmetic predicates.
Podelski and Wies [30] propose an abstraction refinement algorithm for a
shape-analysis domain with a logic-based view of three-valued shape analysis
(specifically, first-order logic plus transitive closure). Spurious counterexamples
are used to either refine the set of predicates used in the analysis, or refine
an imprecise abstract transformer. The approach is used to verify specifications
given by the user as first-order logic formulas. A limitation of the approach
is that refinement is syntactic, and if an important recursive predicate (e.g.,
there is a list from x to null) is not explicitly supplied in the specification, it
cannot be inferred automatically. Furthermore, abstract post computation can
be expensive, as the abstract domain uses quantified predicates. Additionally,
the analysis assumes a memory safe program to start, whereas, in SplInter, we
construct a memory safety proof as part of the invariant, enabling us to detect
unsafe memory operations that lead to undefined program behavior.
Beyer et al. [5] propose using shape analysis information on demand to aug-
ment numerical predicate abstraction. They use shape analysis as a backup anal-
ysis when failing to prove a given path safe without tracking the heap, and in-
crementally refines TVLA’s [6] three-valued shape analysis [35] to track more
heap information as required. As with [30], [5] makes an a priori assumption of
memory safety and requires an expensive abstract post operator.
Finally, Manevich et al. [23] give a theoretical treatment of counterexample-
driven refinement in power set (e.g., shape) abstract domains.
Combined Shape and Data Analyses The work of Magill et al. [22] infers
shape and numerical invariants, and is the most closely related to ours. First, a
separation logic analysis is used to construct a memory safety proof of the whole
program. This proof is then instrumented by adding additional user-defined in-
teger parameters to the recursive predicates appearing in the proof (with corre-
sponding user-defined interpretations). A numerical program is generated from
this instrumented proof and checked using an off-the-shelf verification tool, which
need not reason about the heap. Our technique and [22]’s are similar in that we
both decorate separation logic proofs with additional information: in [22], the
extra information is instrumentation variables; in this paper, the extra infor-
mation is refinement predicates. Neither of these techniques properly subsumes
the other, and we believe that they may be profitably combined. An important
difference is that we synthesize data refinements automatically from program
paths, whereas [22] uses a fixed (though user-definable) abstraction.
A number of papers have proposed abstract domains for shape and data
invariants. Chang and Rival [12] propose a separation logic–based abstract do-
main that is parameterized by programmer-supplied invariant checkers (recur-
sive predicates) and a data domain for reasoning about contents of these struc-
tures. McCloskey et al. [24] also proposed a combination of heap and numeric
abstract domains, this time using 3-valued structures for the heap. While the
approaches to combining shape and data information are significantly different,
an advantage of our method is that it does not lose precision due to limitations
in the abstract domain, widening, and join.
Bouajjani et al. [8, 9] propose an abstract domain for list manipulating pro-
grams that is parameterized by a data domain. They show that by varying the
data domain, one can infer invariants about list sizes, sum of elements, etc. Quan-
tified data automata (QDA) [16] have been proposed as an abstract domain for
representing list invariants where the data in a list is described by a regular
language. In [15], invariants over QDA have been synthesized using language
learning techniques from concrete program executions. Expressive logics have
also been proposed for reasoning about heap and data [31], but have thus far
been only used for invariant checking, not invariant synthesis. A number of deci-
sion procedures for combinations of the singly-linked-list fragment of separation
logic with SMT theories have recently been proposed [28, 29].
Path-based Verification A number of works proposed path-based algorithms
for verification. Our work builds on McMillan’s Impact technique [25] and ex-
tends it to heap/data reasoning. Earlier work [19] used interpolants to compute
predicates from spurious paths in a CEGAR loop. Beyer et al. [4] proposed path
invariants, where infeasible paths induce program slices that are proved correct,
and from which predicates are mined for full program verification. Heizmann
et al. [18] presented a technique that uses interpolants to compute path proofs
and generalize a path into a visibly push-down language of correct paths. In
comparison with SplInter, all of these techniques are restricted to first-order
invariants.
Our work is similar to that of Itzhaky et al. [21], in the sense that we both
generalize from bounded unrollings of the program to compute ingredients of a
proof. However, they compute proofs in a fragment of first-order logic that can
only express linked lists and has not yet been extended to combined heap and
data properties.
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1: function SplInter(P)
2: S ← ∅
3: loop
4: pi ← IsProof(S)
5: if pi is empty then // S is a proof
6: return found proof S
7: else // pi = vi, . . . , ve in P does not appear in S
8: κ← ProvePath(pi)
9: if κ is empty then // No proof computed for pi
10: return found erroneous execution pi
11: S′ ← ∅
12: for each κ′ ∈ S do
13: (κ, κ′)← Conj(κ, κ′)
14: S′ ← S′ ∪ {κ′}
15: S ← S′ ∪ {κ}
Fig. 9. Main Algorithm of SplInter.
A From Proofs of Paths to Proofs of Programs
In this section, we describe how SplInter constructs a proof of correctness
(i.e., unreachability of the error location ve) of a program P = 〈V,E, vi, ve〉
from proofs of individual paths. We note that our algorithm is an extension of
Impact [25] to RSep proofs; we refer the reader to [25] for optimizations and
heuristics. The main difference is the procedure ProvePath, which constructs an
RSep proof for a given program path.
The Main Algorithm Figure 9 shows the main algorithm of SplInter. El-
ements of the set S are program paths from vi to ve, annotated with RSep
formulas. For example,
(a1, v1), (a2, v2), . . . , (an, vn)
is an annotated path where (1) {aj}j are RSep formulas; (2) v1 = vi and
vn = ve; (3) for j ∈ [1, n − 1], (vj , vj+1) ∈ E; (4) for each edge e = (vj , vj+1),
{aj} ec {aj+1} is valid; and (5) an is false (since we are interested in proving
unreachability of ve).
SplInter uses the procedure IsProof to check if the set of annotated paths S
represents a proof of correctness of the whole program. If not, IsProof samples a
new program path (pi) that does not appear in S. Using the procedure ProvePath,
it tries to construct an annotation/proof (using spatial(T ) interpolants) of pi. If
no proof is constructed, SplInter concludes that pi is a feasible execution to
ve (or it performs unsafe memory operations). Otherwise, it uses the procedure
Conj to strengthen the proofs of all program paths in S, adds the annotated path
to S, and restarts the loop.
1: function ProvePath(pi = v1, . . . , vn)
// Check if path is feasible (can reach error location ve).
2: let k be largest integer s.t. exec(v1, . . . , vk) is defined.
3: symbHeap← exec(v1, . . . , vk)
4: // If pi is memory-infeasible,
5: // only compute spatial interpolants,
6: // as theory interpolants are not needed
7: if Sk |= false, where symbHeap = . . . , (Sk, vk) then
8: let k′ 6 k be the largest integer s.t. Sk′ 6|= false
9: spInt← Spatial((v1, . . . , vk′), Sk′)
10: return spInt, (false, vk′+1), . . . , (false, vn)
11: refSymbHeap← Refine(symbHeap, false)
12: if k = 0 or refSymbHeap is undefined then
13: return no proof found
14:
// Path infeasible – construct proof.
15: spInt← Spatial((v1, . . . , vk), true : true)
16: spTheoryInt← Refine(spInt, false)
17: if spTheoryInt is undefined then
18: return refSymbHeap, (false, vk+1), . . . , (false, vn)
19: return spTheoryInt, (false, vk+1), . . . , (false, vn)
Fig. 10. Pseudocode for ProvePath.
Note that the annotated paths in S represent an Abstract Reachability Tree
(ART), as used in [25] as well as other software model checking algorithms. The
tree in this case is rooted at vi, and branching represents when two paths diverge.
We will now describe SplInter’s components in more detail.
IsProof: Checking Proofs Given a set of annotated paths S, we use the pro-
cedure IsProof(S) to check if the annotations represent a proof of the whole
program. Specifically, for each v ∈ V , we use I(v) to denote the formula ∨{aj |
(aj , v) ∈ κ, κ ∈ S}. In other words, for each location v in P, we hypothesize an
inductive invariant I(v) from our current annotations of paths passing through
v. We can then check if our hypotheses indeed form an inductive invariant of the
program. If so, the program is safe: since I(ve) is always false (by definition),
the fact that I is an invariant implies that the post-state of any execution which
reaches ve must satisfy false, and therefore the error location ve is unreachable.
Otherwise, IsProof returns a new program path on which our hypothesized in-
variant does not hold, which we use to refine our hypotheses. In practice, one
can perform IsProof implicitly and lazily by maintaining a covering (entailment)
relation [25] over the nodes of the ART.
ProvePath: Constructing a Proof of a Path Figure 10 shows an algorithm
for computing a proof of a path pi. First, in lines 2-13, we check if pi is feasible
(i.e., whether pi corresponds to a real program execution). We do this by com-
puting the strongest postconditions along pi (using exec) and then attempting to
strengthen the annotation (using Refine) with theory interpolants to prove that
false is a postcondition of pi. If no such strengthening is found, we know that pi
is feasible (by Theorem 3). Note that if pi is memory-infeasible (lines 7-10), then
we only compute spatial interpolants along the memory-feasible prefix of the
path and return the result. This is because when the path is memory-infeasible,
we do not need data refinements along the path to prove it cannot reach ve.
The function Spatial((v1, . . . , vn), P ) takes a program path pi = v1, . . . , vn
and a Sep formula P and returns the path annotated with spatial interpolants
w.r.t the postcondition P . The function Refine(κ, ϕ) takes an annotated program
path κ with Sep formulas (from spatial interpolants) and a ϕ ∈ DFormula and
returns a refined annotation of κ that proves the postcondition ϕ (using theory
interpolants).
If the path pi is infeasible, we proceed by constructing spatial(T ) interpolants
for it (lines 15-19). We use the function Spatial (Section 4) to construct spatial
interpolants, which we then refine with theory interpolants using the function
Refine (Section 5). Spatial path interpolants are computed with respect to the
postcondition true : true, indicating that we are looking for a memory safety
proof. Note that we might not be able to find theory interpolants if the spa-
tial interpolants computed are too weak and hide important data elements (in
which case, on line 18, we use the result of exec as the spatial interpolants –
the strongest possible spatial interpolants). To illustrate how this could happen,
consider Figure 11: a modification to our illustrative example from Figure 2.
node* x = null; int i = 2;
while (i > 0)
node* tmp = malloc(node);
tmp->N = x; tmp->D = i;
x = tmp; i--;
i = 1;
P: while (x != null)
if (isOdd(i))
assert(isOdd(x->D))
x = x->N; i++;
Fig. 11. Refinement Example.
Here, a list of length 2 is constructed. The second loop checks that nodes
at odd positions in the linked list have odd data elements. Suppose SplInter
samples the path that goes through the first loop twice and enters the second
loop arriving at the assertion. Our spatial interpolation procedure will introduce
a list segment ls(x, null) at location P. As a result, we cannot find a refinement
that proves the assertion, since using the list segment predicate definition from
Section 3 we cannot specify that the first element is odd and the second is
even. This is because refinements must apply to all elements of ls, and cannot
mention specific positions. In this case, we use the symbolic heaps as our spatial
interpolants. That is, we annotate location P with x 7→ [d′1, e′] ∗ e′ 7→ [d′2, null].
Consequently, theory interpolants are able to refine this by specifying that d′1 is
odd.
Conj: Conjoining Proofs of Paths When a new annotated path κ is com-
puted, we strengthen the proofs of all annotated paths κ′ in S that share a
prefix with κ using an operation Conj(κ, κ′), defined in the following. (This
is analogous to strengthening annotations of a path in an ART – all other
paths sharing a prefix with the strengthened path also get strengthened.) Let
κ = (a1, v1), . . . , (an, vn) and κ
′ = (a′1, v
′
1), . . . , (a
′
m, v
′
m). Let k be the largest
integer such that for all j 6 k, vj = v′j (i.e., k represents the longest shared
prefix of κ and κ′). Conj returns a pair (κ, κ′) consisting of the strengthened
annotations:
κ← (a1 ∧ a′1, v1), . . . , (ak ∧ a′k, vk), (ak+1, vk+1), . . . , (an, vn)
κ′ ← (a1 ∧ a′1, v1), . . . , (ak ∧ a′k, vk), (a′k+1, v′k+1), . . . , (a′m, v′m)
The issue here is that RSep is not closed under logical conjunction (∧), since we
do not allow logical conjunction of spatial conjunctions, e.g., (ls(x, y) ∗ true) ∧
(ls(y, z) ∗ true). In practice, we heuristically under-approximate the logical con-
junction, using the strongest postcondition of the shared prefix to guide the
under-approximation. Any under-approximation which over-approximates the
strongest postcondition (including the strongest postcondition itself) is sound,
but overly strong annotations may not generalize to a proof of the whole pro-
gram. Note that the above transformation maintains the invariant that all paths
in S are annotated with valid Hoare triples.
B Proofs
In this section, we present proof sketches for the theorems appearing in this
paper.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 4. Let S and I ′ be RSep formulas and let c be a command such that
exec(c, S) |= I ′. Then
(I) S |= itp(S, c, I ′)
(II) {itp(S, c, I ′)} c {I ′}
Proof. We prove one case to give intuition on why the theorem holds.
Suppose c is an allocation statement x := new(n,m).
Recall that we defined
itp(S, c, I ′) = (∃x. A)
where
exec(c, S) ` (∃∅. (∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z]) ∗ [A]) ` I ′
Define
S′ = exec(c, S) = S[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z]
for x′,~a, ~z fresh.
First we show (I). By the properties of bounded abduction, we have
S′ = S[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z] |= A ∗ ((∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z]))
from which we can see that
S[x′/x] |= A |= (∃x. A)
and thus
S |= (∃x. A) = itp(S, c, I ′)
Next we show (II). We compute
exec(c, (∃x. A)) = (∃x′,~a, ~z. ((∃x. A))[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z])
where x′,~a, ~z are fresh.
≡ (∃x′,~a, ~z. ((∃x. A)) ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z])
≡ ((∃x. A)) ∗ ((∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z]))
Since S′ is of the form S[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~z] and S′ |= A ∗ true, the only place
where x may appear in A is in a disequality with some other allocated variable.
It follows that
((∃x. A)) ∗ ((∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z])) ≡ A ∗ ((∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z]))
By the properties of bounded abduction, we have
A ∗ ((∃~a, ~z. x 7→ [~a, ~z])) |= I
and thus
exec(c, (∃x. A)) |= I
and finally
{itp(S, c, I ′)} c {I ′}
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 5 (Soundness). Suppose that pi is a path and that ζ is a proof of the
judgement C I {Π : Σ} pi {Π ′ : Σ′}, and that σ is a solution to C. Then ζσ,
the proof obtained by applying the substitution σ to ζ, is a (refined) separation
logic proof of
{(Π : Σ)σ} pi {(Π ′ : Σ′)σ} .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on ζ. We will give an illustrative example
using an entailment judgement.
Suppose that ζ is an entailment proof consisting of a single application of
the Predicate rule:
Predicate
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ;Ψ ′1 ← Ψ1 ∧ Φ;· · · ;Ψ ′|~τ | ← Ψ|~τ | ∧ Φ I
Π ∧ Φ : Z(~τ , ~E) ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Z(~τ ′, ~E)
(where τi = (λ~ai.Ψi) and τ
′
i = (λ~ai.Ψ
′
i)). Suppose that σ is a solution to the
constraint system
C = Φ′ ← Φ;Ψ ′1 ← Ψ1 ∧ Φ;· · · ;Ψ ′|~τ | ← Ψ|~τ | ∧ Φ
Since σ is a solution to C, we have that
Φ′σ ⇐ Φσ and for all i, Ψ ′σi ⇐ Ψσi ∧ Φσ
and thus (noting that Π |= Π ′)
Π ∧ Φσ |= Π ′ ∧ Φ′σ and for all i, Ψσi ∧Π ∧ Φσ |= Ψ ′σi
It follows that ζσ, given below, is a valid derivation:
Predicate
Π ∧ Φ′σ |= Π ′ ∧ Φ′σ Ψσ1 ∧Π ∧ Φσ |= Ψ ′1 · · · Ψσn ∧Π ∧ Φσ |= Ψ ′σn
Π ∧ Φσ : Z(~τσ0 , ~E) ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′σ : Z(~τσ1 , ~E)
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 6 (Completeness). Suppose that pi is a memory-safe path and ζ is
the proof of the judgement
C I {R0(~v) : emp} pi {R1(~v) : true}
obtained by symbolic execution. If ϕ is a data formula such that {true : emp} pi {ϕ :
true} holds, then there is a solution σ to C such that Rσ1 (~v)⇒ ϕ.
Proof. Consider that for each formula (∃X. Π : Σ) in a symbolic execution
sequence, Σ is a *-conjunction of (finitely many) points-to predicates. The con-
straints we generate in this situation are the same as the ones that would be
generated for a program which does not access the heap (but which has addi-
tional variables corresponding to data-typed heap fields).
C Formalization of RSep and Sep
In this section we present the full proof systems for RSep and Sep, as well as
the full set of constraint generation rules which we described in Section 5. The
syntax and semantics of RSep formulas, in terms of stacks and heaps, are shown
in Figures 12 and 13.
Syntax
x, y ∈ HVar Heap variables
a, b ∈ DVar Data variables
A ∈ DTerm First-order term that evaluates to value in D
ϕ ∈ DFormula Data formulas
Z ∈ RPred Recursive predicates
θ ∈ Refinement ::= λ~a.ϕ
X ⊆ Var ::= x | a
E, F ∈ HTerm ::= null | x
Æ ::= A | E
Π ∈ Pure ::= true | E = E | E 6= E | ϕ | Π ∧Π
H ∈ Heaplet ::= true | emp | E 7→ [ ~A, ~E] | Z(~θ, ~E)
Σ ∈ Spatial ::= H | H ∗Σ
P ∈ RSep ::= (∃X. Π : Σ)
Fig. 12. Syntax of RSep formulas.
D Spatial interpolation for assumptions
In the spatial interpolation rules for assume presented in Section 4, we encoun-
tered the following problem: we have an equality or disequality assertion Π, a
symbolic heap S, and a formula M such that S ∧Π `M , and we need to com-
pute a formula M ′ such that S ` M ′ and M ′ ∧Π ` M . Moreover, we wish M ′
to be as weak as possible (i.e., M ′ should be “close to M” rather than “close to
S”).
In this section, we will define a recursive procedure pitp(S,Π,M) which takes
as input a symbolic heap S, an equality or disequality formula Π, and a Sep
formula M such that S ∧Π ` M and computes a formula M ′ = pitp(S,Π,M)
such that S ` M ′ and M ′ ∧ Π ` M . We will assume that S = ΠS : ΣS is
saturated in the sense that for any assertion Π0, if S ` Π0 then ΠS ` Π0, and
that S ∧Π is satisfiable.
We observe that if M has existentially quantified variables, they can be in-
stantiated using the proof of S ∧ Π ` M . Thus we may assume that M is
quantifier-free, and write M as
M = ΠM : H1 ∗· · · ∗Hn
The proof of S ∧ Π ` M also induces an n-colouring on S which colours each
points-to predicate in S with the index i of the corresponding heaplet Hi (cf.
step 1 of the bounded abduction procedure presented in Section 6). We may thus
write S as follows:
S = ΠS : [Σ1]
1 ∗· · · ∗ [Σn]n
(such that for each i, ΠS ∧Π : Σi ` ΠM : Hi).
We will compute a pure formula Π ′M such that ΠS ` Π ′M and Π ′M ∧Π ` ΠM
and for each i we will compute a formula Pi such that ΠS : Σi ` Pi and
Pi ∧Π ` Hi. We then take pitp(S,Π,M) to be Π ′M : P1 ∗· · · ∗ Pn.
First, we show how to compute Π ′M . Note that note that since S is saturated,
the fact that S ∧ Π ` M implies ΠS ∧ Π ` ΠM . We will assume that ΠM
consists of a single equality or disequality: the procedure can be extended to
arbitrary conjunction by applying it separately for each conjunct and conjoining
the results. If ΠS ` ΠM then we simply take Π ′M to be ΠM . Otherwise, assume
w, x, y, z are such that Π is an equality or disequality w = x / w 6= x and ΠM
is an equality or disequality y = z / y 6= z. Since ΠS ∧Π ` ΠM and ΠS 6` ΠM ,
there is some y′, z′ ∈ {w, x} such that ΠS ` y = y′∧ z = z′ (to see why, consider
each of the four cases for ΠS and ΠM ). We take Π
′
M to be y = y
′ ∧ z = z′.
Finally, we show how to compute Pi (for each i ∈ [1, n]). If ΠS : Σi ` Hi,
then we simply take Pi to be Hi. Otherwise, suppose that Hi is Z( ~E) for some
predicate Z and vector of heap terms ~E (the case that Hi is a points-to predicate
is essentially a special case). First, we attempt to find a vector of heap terms ~E′
such that ΠS : Σi ` Z( ~E′) and ΠS ∧Π ` Ej = E′j for each j (noting that there
are finitely many such ~E′ to choose from). If we succeed, we may take Pi to be
Π ′ : Z( ~E′), where Π ′ = pitp(S,Π,
∧
j Ej = E
′
j). If we fail, then since ΠS ∧Π :
Σi ` Z( ~E), there is some Q ∈ cases(Z(~R, ~x)) such that ΠS ∧Π : Σi ` Q[ ~E/~x].
We may take Pi to be pitp(ΠS : Σi, Π,Q[ ~E/~x]).
Semantic Domains
Var = HVar + DVar
Val = Loc +D
Stack = Var→ Val
Heap = Loc ⇀fin Rec
Rec = 〈N⇀fin D,N⇀fin Loc〉
State = Stack× Heap
Satisfaction Semantics
s, h |= E = F ⇐⇒ JEK(s) = JF K(s)
s, h |= E 6= F ⇐⇒ JEK(s) 6= JF K(s)
s, h |= ϕ ⇐⇒ JϕK(s)
s, h |= Π1 ∧Π2 ⇐⇒ (s, h |= Π1) and (s, h |= Π2)
s, h |= Z(~τ , ~E) ⇐⇒ ∃P ∈ cases(Z(~R, ~x)).s, h |= P [~τ/~R, ~E/~x]
s, h |= emp ⇐⇒ dom(h) = ∅
s, h |= E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ⇐⇒ dom(h) = {JEK(s)}
and h(JEK(s)) =
〈{i 7→ JAiK(s)|i ∈ [1, | ~A|]}, {i 7→ JFiK(s)|i ∈ [1, |~F |]}〉
s, h |= Σ ∗Σ′ ⇐⇒ there exists h0, h1 s.t. h0 unionmulti h1 = h
and (s, h0 |= Σ) and (s, h1 |= Σ′)
s, h |= Π : Σ ⇐⇒ (s, h |= Π) and (s, h |= Σ)
s, h |= (∃X. Π : Σ) ⇐⇒ there exists s : X → Val s.t. s⊕ s, h |= Π : Σ
Note that we model records (Rec) as two finite maps representing data
fields and heap fields.
We use unionmulti to denote union of functions with disjoint domains, and ⊕ to denote
overriding union of functions.
Fig. 13. Stack/heap semantics of RSep formulas.
Entailment rules
Empty
Π |= Π ′
Π : emp ` Π ′ : emp
∃-left
P [x′/x] ` Q
(∃x. P ) ` Q
∃-right
P ` Q[Æ/x]
P ` (∃x. Q)
Predicate
Π |= Π ′ ϕ1 ∧Π |= ϕ′1 · · · ϕn ∧Π |= ϕ′n
Π : Z(~τ, ~E) ` Π ′ : Z(~τ ′, ~E)
Where τi = (λ~ai.ϕi)
and τ ′i = (λ~ai.ϕ
′
i)
True
Π |= Π ′
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : true
Points-to
Π |= Π ′
Π : E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ : E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ]
Star
Π : Σ0 ` Π ′ : Σ′0 Π : Σ1 ` Π ′ : Σ′1
Π : Σ0 ∗Σ1 ` Π ′ : Σ′0 ∗Σ′1
Substitution
Π[E/x] : Σ[E/x] ` Π ′[E/x] : Σ′[E/x] Π |= x = E
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′
null-not-Lval
Π ∧ E 6= null : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ : Σ′
Π : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ : Σ′
*-Partial
Π ∧ E 6= F : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~E] ∗ F 7→ [ ~B, ~F ] ` Π ′ : Σ′
Π : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~E] ∗ F 7→ [ ~B, ~F ] ` Π ′ : Σ′
Fold
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ P [~τ/~R, ~E/~x]
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ Z(~τ, ~E) P ∈ cases(Z(
~R, ~x))
Unfold
Π : Σ ∗ P1[~τ/~R, ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
· · · Π : Σ ∗ Pn[~τ/~R, ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
Π : Σ ∗ Z(~τ, ~E) ` Π ′ : Σ′ {P1, . . . , Pn} = cases(Z(
~R, ~x))
Fig. 14. RSep Proof System
Execution rules
Assign
{Π : Σ} x := Æ {(∃x′. Π[x′/x] ∧ x = Æ[x′/x] : Σ[x′/x])}
Assume
{Π : Σ} assume(Π ′) {Π ∧Π ′ : Σ}
Sequence
{P} pi0 {O} {O} pi1 {Q}
{P} pi0;pi1 {Q}
Data-Store
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
{Π : Σ} x->Di := A {Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A[A/Ai], ~E]}
Heap-Store
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
{Π : Σ} x->Ni := E {Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E[E/Ei]]}
Data-Load
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
{Π : Σ} y := x->Di {(∃y′. Π ′[y′/y] ∧ y = Ai[y′/y] : (Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])[y′/y])}
Free
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
{Π : Σ} free(x) {Π ′ : Σ′}
Heap-Load
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
{Π : Σ} y := x->Ni {(∃y′. Π ′[y′/y] ∧ y = Ei[y′/y] : (Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])[y′/y])}
Consequence
P ′ ` P {P} c {Q} Q ` Q′
{P ′} c {Q′}
Alloc
{Π : Σ} x := new(n,m) {(∃x′,~a, ~y. Π[x′/x] : Σ[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~y])}
Exists
{P} c {Q}
{(∃x. P )} c {Q} x /∈ Var(Q) ∪ Var(c)
Fig. 15. RSep proof system.
Predicate
Π |= Π ′
Π : Z( ~E) ` Π ′ : Z( ~E)
Fold
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ P [ ~E/~x]
Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ Z( ~E) P ∈ cases(Z(
~R, ~x))
Unfold
Π : Σ ∗ P1[ ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
· · ·
Π : Σ ∗ Pn[ ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
Π : Σ ∗ Z( ~E) ` Π ′ : Σ′ {P1, . . . , Pn} = cases(Z(
~R, ~x))
Fig. 16. Sep proof system. All other entailment and execution rules are as in Figure 14.
Entailment rules
Empty
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ I Π ∧ Φ : emp ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : emp
True
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ I Π ∧ Φ : Σ ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : true
Inconsistent
Π |= false
[] I Π ∧ Φ : Σ ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′
∃-left
C I P [x′/x] ` Q
C I (∃x. P ) ` Q
Substitution
C I Π[E/x] ∧ Φ : Σ[E/x] ` Π ′[E/x] ∧ Φ′ : Σ′[E/x] Π |= x = E
C I Π ∧ Φ : Σ ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′
null-not-Lval
C I Π ∧ Φ ∧ E 6= null : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′
C I Π ∧ Φ : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′
∃-right
C I P ` Q[Æ/x]
C I P ` (∃x. Q)
*-Partial
C I Π ∧ E 6= F ∧ Φ : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~E] ∗ F 7→ [ ~B, ~F ] ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′
C I Π ∧ Φ : Σ ∗ E 7→ [ ~A, ~E] ∗ F 7→ [ ~B, ~F ] ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′
Star
C0 I Π ∧ Φ : Σ0 ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′0 C1 I Π ∧ Φ : Σ1 ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′1
C0; C1 I Π ∧ Φ : Σ0 ∗Σ1 ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Σ′0 ∗Σ′1
Points-to
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ I Π ∧ Φ : E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ] ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : E 7→ [ ~A, ~F ]
Fold
C I Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ P [~τ/~R, ~E/~x]
C I Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ Z(~τ, ~E) P ∈ cases(Z(
~R, ~x))
Unfold
C1 I Π : Σ ∗ P1[~τ/~R, ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
· · · Cn I Π : Σ ∗ Pn[~τ/~R, ~E/~x] ` Π ′ : Σ′
C1; . . . ; Cn I Π : Σ ∗ Z(~τ, ~E) ` Π ′ : Σ′
{P1, . . . , Pn} = cases(Z(~R, ~x))
Predicate
Π |= Π ′
Φ′ ← Φ;Ψ ′1 ← Ψ1 ∧ Φ; . . . ;Ψ ′|~τ | ← Ψ ′|~τ | ∧ Φ I Π ∧ Φ : Z(~τ, ~E) ` Π ′ ∧ Φ′ : Z(~τ ′, ~E)
Where τi = (λ~ai.Ψi)
and τ ′i = (λ~ai.Ψ
′
i)
Fig. 17. Constraint Generation: Entailment Rules
Execution rules
Data-Assume
C I P ∧ ϕ ` Q
C I {P} assume(ϕ) {Q}
Free
C I P ` Π ∧ Φ : Σ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
C I {P} free(x) {Π ∧ Φ : Σ}
Sequence
C0 I {P} pi0 {Ô} C1 I {Ô} pi1 {Q}
C0; C1 I {P} pi0;pi1 {Q}
Data-Load
C0 I P ` (∃X. Π ∧ Φ̂ : Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])
C1 I (∃X, a′. Π[a′/a] ∧ Φ̂[a′/a] ∧ a = Ai[a′/a] : (Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])[a′/a]) ` Q
C0; C1 I {P} a := x->Di {Q}
Data-Assign
C I (∃a′. Π ∧ Φ[a′/a] ∧ a = A[a′/a] : Σ[a′/a] ` Q)
C I {Π ∧ Φ : Σ} a := A {Q}
Data-Store
C0 I P ` (∃X. Π ∧ Φ̂ : Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])
C1 I (∃X, a′. Π ∧ Φ̂ ∧ a′ = A : Σ̂ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A[a′/Ai], ~E]) ` Q
C0; C1 I {P} x->Di := A {Q}
Alloc
C I (∃x′,~a, ~x. Π[x′/x] ∧ Φ : Σ[x′/x] ∗ x 7→ [~a, ~x]) ` Q
C I {Π ∧ Φ : Σ} x := new(n,m) {Q}
Heap-Store
C I Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
C I {Π : Σ} x->Ni := E {Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E[E/Ei]]}
Consequence
C1 I P ′ ` P̂ C2 I {P̂} c {Q̂} C3 I Q̂ ` Q′
C1; C2; C3 I {P ′} c {Q′}
Heap-Load
C I Π : Σ ` Π ′ : Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E]
C I {Π : Σ} y := x->Ni {(∃y′. Π ′[y′/y] ∧ y = Ei[y′/y] : (Σ′ ∗ x 7→ [ ~A, ~E])[y′/y])}
Fig. 18. Constraint Generation: Execution Rules
